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Shell Nigeria’s Global Memorandum of Understanding and corporate-community 
accountability relations: A critical appraisal 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study seeks to examine whether Shell Nigeria’s Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU) promotes corporate-community accountability as a basis for fostering 
sustainable community development in the Niger Delta.   
 
Design/methodology/approach: Shell Nigeria’s GMoU stand-alone reports were analysed 
through the lenses of accountability and transparency theoretical frameworks to explore the 
extent to which GMoU, as a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative, is dialogically 
embedded and practised. Meaning-oriented content analysis was deductively used to isolate 
pertinent themes and generate findings from the background theoretical literature.  
 
Findings: We find that Shell discursively appropriates the meaning of accountability and 
transparency in a manner that allows it to maintain its social legitimacy and the asymmetric 
power relations between itself and host communities whilst restricting communities’ agency to 
hold it accountable. Shell does this by interpreting the notion of participation restrictively, 
selectively deploying the concept of transparency and accountability, and subtly exerting 
excessive control over the GMoU. Thus, the GMoU’s potential to contribute to sustainable 
community development and positive corporate-community relation is unlikely tenable. 
 
Originality/value: Accountability and transparency are core and critical to corporate-
community relations and for achieving community development CSR objectives, but are often 
taken for granted or ignored in the CSR literature on the Niger Delta of Nigeria. This paper 
addresses this gap in the literature by using accountability and transparency lenses to unpick 
GMoU model and contribute to studies on CSR practices by oil MNCs in developing countries. 
Indeed, the use of these lenses to explore CSR process offers new insights as to why CSR 
practices have failed to contribute to sustainable community development despite increased 
community spending by oil MNCs.  
 
 
Keywords:  CSR/GMoU, corporate-community relations, accountability/transparency, Shell, 
engagement/dialogue, Niger Delta communities. 
 
1. Introduction  
Corporations possess power to influence the social space (Davis, 1960). This has in part 
increased demand for accountability and social responsibility, especially in developing 
economies (Belal et al., 2013; Gray, 2006). It resonates with Davis (1960, 1967) and Gray 
(2000) who argue that the responsibility of a business should be commensurate with its power 
and so business should be held to account accordingly. In relation to this power-responsibility 
argument, there have been normative debates in the past four decades or so on whether the 
social responsibility of business is to meet the objective of profit maximization for capital 
providers (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002), or to address society’s expectations (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975) and the needs of multi-stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984).  
These debates have been articulated around the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) which has evolved into different areas of interests (Reich, 2008). 
According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, CSR “is the 
continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic 
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development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as 
of the local community and society at large” (WBCSD, 1999, p. 3). Several corporations 
around the world (especially multinational corporations [MNCs]) have embraced CSR 
practices to varying degrees, whether instrumentally to secure social licence to operate (SLO) 
or as a strategic business practice (Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2014a, 2014b; Slack, 2012). For 
example, as part of the business-case for CSR, corporations find incentives to engage in 
stakeholder management. One of the approaches or instruments corporations use to manage 
their stakeholders, especially their host communities, is the memorandum of understanding 
(MoU). Corporations in the extractive industries heavily use MoUs as an instrument to 
maintain their relationship with host communities and foster communities’ participation in 
addressing corporate impacts on them (see Fidler and Hitch, 2007).  
However, the participation of communities in negotiation and dialogue with the MNCs 
may have several shortcomings. Garvey and Newell (2005) and Newenham-Kahindi (2011), 
for example, argue that communities do not speak with one voice due to ambiguous and 
conflicting interests among them. Governments may also undermine the interest of the 
communities (Neu and Heincke, 2004) by creating corporate-community power imbalance in 
favour of MNCs (Webie, 2015), and accordingly restricting the available space within which 
the communities can contest their rights and responsibilities (Newell, 2005). In managing this 
problem through CSR practices, the MNCs tend to overwhelmingly focus on community 
development initiatives  as a means of managing and responding to community grievances, as 
well as making them benefit from resource extraction (Eweje, 2007; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 
2007a; 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2007). However, stakeholders’ 
increasing criticisms of corporations in the extractive industry over the impacts of corporate 
operations on stakeholders and society, and the perceived inability of CSR to deliver on its 
promise have engendered a call for a shift from CSR to corporate accountability in the industry 
(Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Utting, 2008). This is because whereas corporate focus on 
community development initiatives is important, it tends to occlude the equally important need 
to hold corporations accountable in developing economies, often marred by weak market and 
governance institutions (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Garvey and Newell, 2005;  Newell, 2001).  
Unfortunately, many of the extant studies on CSR in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have 
tended to focus on assessing the outcomes of CSR practices and less on the processes via which 
CSR seeks to contribute to community development (Idemudia, 2008). Hence, we are still 
unable to explain why, despite the increase in CSR spending and changes in oil MNCs’ CSR 
strategies, corporate-community relations remain conflictual (Idemudia, 2010a; Idemudia and 
Ite, 2006). Consequently, Idemudia (2008) has argued that we need to move from a focus on 
CSR outcomes (questions of whether CSR is good or bad for community development) to a 
focus on CSR processes (e.g. questions of accountability, transparency, power relations, etc.) 
if we are to better understand how and why CSR is (un)able to contribute to community 
development (see Idemudia, 2014a).  
Against this background, this paper critically examines Shell’s[1] GMoU in the Niger 
Delta via accountability and transparency theoretical frameworks. This is important as it helps 
to ascertain the extent to which GMoU, theoretically and practically, promotes corporate-
community accountability necessary for fostering sustainable community development in 
Nigeria’s Niger-Delta. The paper continues with an overview of CSR in the Nigerian oil 
industry, explores the shifting from CSR discourse to corporate accountability before 
discussing corporate-community agreements in the extractive industry, as well as the 
emergence of the GMoU strategy in Shell’s community development efforts. It then proceeds 
to discuss the methodology, findings, and conclusion. 
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2. An overview of CSR in the Nigerian oil industry 
National CSR agenda is often a product of historical and cultural factors (Campbell, 
2008; Matten and Moon, 2008), and it often continues to mature according to the prevailing 
economic and political priorities of the country (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). In Nigeria, the 
proactive pursuit of CSR initiatives and their implementation as a business strategy is a 
relatively new and an emerging practice. However, CSR practices appear to have taken a strong 
root in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Amao, 2008; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite 2004) given 
the increase in CSR budgets over time (Aaron, 2011; Akpan, 2006; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia 
and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2007). The prominence of CSR in the Nigerian oil industry stems from the 
fact that oil production remains core to the Nigerian economy and the negative social and 
environmental impacts associated with oil extraction are always at the centre of public scrutiny.  
For instance, the environmental degradation, high poverty, and the endemic nature of 
corporate–community conflict in the Niger Delta region where oil is mainly extracted, bring 
the oil MNCs into public gaze and scrutiny. Consequently, oil MNCs have had to develop 
different non-market strategies – often driven by corporate self-interest, the avoidance of 
negative reputational consequences and the quest for unhindered oil extraction (Aaron, 2011; 
Frynas 2005) – to respond to both local and international stakeholders’ pressures (Akpan, 2006; 
Eweje, 2007) and secure SLO (Idemudia and Osanyande, 2016). In contrast, however, Ite 
(2004; 2007) contends that the MNCs’ pursuit of CSR activities in the Niger Delta is not mainly 
due to the need to secure/maintain SLO, but also emanates from a commitment to foster 
community development in the region. Similarly, others have suggested that a key driver of 
CSR practices in the Niger Delta is the Nigerian government’s failure to embark on community 
infrastructural development. This, according to many commentators, accounts for why the local 
communities in the region demand for and expect CSR contribution to community 
development (Akpan, 2006; 2008; Frynas, 2009; Ite, 2004).   
Notwithstanding, Idemudia (2014b) argues that this claim is too simplistic as the drive 
for greater demand for oil MNCs’ CSR initiatives goes beyond governmental failure, because 
communities’ demand for CSR is also due to the nature of oil business, the close relationship 
between oil MNCs and the Nigerian government, and the fact that oil MNCs will leave once 
oil wells dry up. While Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) suggest that the CSR initiatives of oil 
MNCs risk promoting governmental failure as the Nigerian government abandons its 
developmental responsibility to host communities, findings from Idemudia (2014b) suggest 
that oil MNCs’ CSR efforts have little or no relationship with governmental community 
development efforts in the region. Hence, he concludes that the close relationship between oil 
MNCs and the Nigerian government, and the very nature of oil extraction, tend to better explain 
why communities expect government-like functions from the companies. Essentially, rather 
than seeing CSR as a domain of shifting responsibility as Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) suggest, 
Idemudia (2014b) suggests that CSR is a domain of stakeholder contestation with negative 
consequences for community development. From this perspective, it can be argued that oil 
MNCs have both been victims and benefactors of governmental failure in the Niger Delta 
(Idemudia, 2010b).    
Nonetheless, the problems associated with doing business in Nigeria are well 
documented (see Economist, 2002). Issues of ethnicity and associated ethnic conflicts, absence 
of efficient social, economic, political institutions, and widespread corruption, allegedly pose 
formidable challenges to business in Nigeria (see Idemudia, 2007a). Consequently, Amaeshi 
et al. (2016) and Ite (2004) argued that the enabling environment for CSR is either lacking or 
yet-to-be developed, and at best, ineffective. This makes CSR practice in the oil industry not 
only difficult, but also often poor in innovativeness to deal with the unique challenges. Shell’s 
attempts to clean up oil spills during Rukpokwu spill in Rivers State of Nigeria were stalled 
for months because of internal wrangling among communities over who should be awarded the 
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contracts (SPDC, 2003). Consequently, the delayed remediation led to more severe 
environmental degradation and communities’ economic loss, which could have been prevented 
via early clean-up of the spill. Hence, internal divisions within communities and the associated 
conflicts in the Niger Delta hinder good CSR practices and limit the positive impacts of CSR 
initiatives on community development. 
Consequently, the debate on CSR practices in the Nigerian oil industry focuses on the 
relationship between CSR practices and community development.  This is premised on the 
assumption that if oil MNCs can contribute to community development via CSR, it will help 
to address local grievances, improve community livelihood and promote positive corporate-
community relations (Idemudia, 2010a). As such, a number of works have sought to either 
examine the most effective governance model for implementing CSR or focus on the extent to 
which CSR has promoted community development. For example, Idemudia (2009a) compares 
two types of corporate strategy (i.e. corporate-community foundation and In-house corporate-
community investment models) adopted by different oil MNCs to contribute to community 
development and improve corporate legitimacy in the region. These models aim to help oil 
MNCs secure their SLO, promote positive stakeholder relationship, and contribute to 
community development. He argued that whilst the corporate-community foundation model is 
partly community-driven, mediated by development NGOs and allows decision-making to be 
shared between the company and communities, the investment model is corporate-driven and 
managed in-house by the company. Therefore, the corporate-community foundation model 
allows for better communication, improved opportunity to rebuild trust, and a more effective 
community engagement strategy compared to the in-house corporate-community investment 
model. Idemudia (2009a) thus concluded that given that two-way communication, trust and 
effective engagement are vital for community development, the corporate–community 
foundation is a likely better vehicle for oil MNCs to contribute to community development 
than the in-house corporate-community investment model.  
Similarly, Idemudia (2014c) recently compared the GMoU with the other two models 
and suggested that the GMoU model and the corporate-community foundation model share 
some common similarities as both enable some form of community participation in the CSR 
initiatives. For example, whilst the in-house corporate-community investment model is largely 
a top-down approach to project design and implementation devoid of community input (Ite, 
2004), the GMoU model, like the corporate-community foundation, claims to follow a bottom-
up approach. However, Idemudia (2014c) cautioned that each of these models has strengths 
and weaknesses from a corporate perspective with real implications for stakeholder 
relationship.    
Furthermore, there continues to remain disagreement about the extent to which the CSR 
initiatives of oil companies have contributed to community development in the region. For 
example, Akpan (2006; 2008) and Frynas (2005) have both argued that the CSR initiatives of 
oil MNCs have failed to contribute to community development and in some instances have 
caused inter- and intra-community conflicts (see also Aaron, 2011; 2012). In contrast, Ite 
(2005; 2007) suggested that the MNCs’ CSR initiatives have actually contributed to 
community development in the region given the extent of governmental failure. According to 
him, oil MNCs have continually changed their CSR strategies for improved responsiveness to 
their host communities. Yet,  Lompo and Trani (2013) recently offered a nuanced perspective 
by arguing that while the CSR initiatives of oil MNCs have contributed to access to basic 
capabilities like water, electricity and shelter, they have also undermined human development.  
Similarly, Renouard and Lado (2012) noted that the CSR activities of oil MNCs have 
somewhat contributed to the improvement of the material well-being of some of the people 
living close to oil production sites, accompanied by deteriorated inequalities or ‘relational 
capabilities.’ This latter position seems to reaffirm the view that while the CSR initiatives of 
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oil MNCs might address their affirmative duties (i.e., doing moral and social good), they fail 
to address their negative injunction duties (i.e., preventing harm and correcting injuries 
inflicted) (Idemudia, 2009b). This is consistent with other experiences from elsewhere captured 
in mainstream CSR discourse. Utting (2007), for example, noted that while CSR initiatives  
might contribute to the ‘hard’ aspects of social development such as road and school 
construction or environmental protection, they often fail with regard to the ‘soft’ aspects of 
development such as empowerment, social justice, fairness and equality (see also Utting and 
Marques, 2010). Hence, Renouard and Lado, (2012) have concluded that oil MNCs in the Niger 
Delta need to focus on addressing those exceptional aspects of inequalities for which they are 
partly responsible.   
The foregoing debates have been particularly insightful in highlighting the strengths 
and limitations of CSR as a vehicle for furthering community development in weak institutional 
contexts. While Idemudia (2007b) points out that disjuncture in corporate-community 
worldviews undermines CSR ability to contribute to community development, Frynas (2005) 
shows how CSR initiatives of oil MNCs are constrained by structural factors that undermine 
their effectiveness. Similarly, Eweje (2007) attributes the failure of CSR to deliver 
development to lack of trust between oil MNCs and local communities and the mismatch 
between corporate CSR rhetoric and CSR practices. However, these works suffer from two 
major shortcomings. First, in examining the relationship between CSR and community 
development, most of these works (except Idemudia, 2010b; 2014b) tend to over-emphasize 
corporate responsibility without a commensurate attention to stakeholder reciprocal 
responsibility. Yet the success or failure of CSR practices to contribute to community 
development largely depends on corporate responsibility and stakeholder reciprocal 
responsibility as CSR practices do not occur in a vacuum (Idemudia, 2008; 2010b). Second, 
since most analyses of CSR-community development relation in the Niger Delta tend to focus 
on outcomes associated with CSR initiatives and not on the processes via which CSR 
supposedly contribute to community development, the issue of corporate accountability and its 
implications for the ability of CSR initiatives to contribute to community development have 
been largely ignored. Indeed, Garvey and Newell (2005) have noted that mainstream CSR 
discourse has often paid insufficient attention to the issue of corporate accountability, or the 
role of power vis-à-vis how the mechanisms of accountability and spaces of community 
participation in CSR initiatives work in practice. Yet this is particularly problematic given that 
numerous studies have demonstrated that corporate accountability is necessary if corporations 
are to contribute to community development (see Newell, 2001; 2008; Utting, 2005; 2008). 
Consequently, to begin to address this gap, this paper seeks to explore the extent to which 
transparency and accountability, as well as participation are embedded in Shell’s GMoU 
strategy for contributing to community development in its host communities. 
 
3. Shifting from CSR discourse to corporate accountability   
The disagreements over the extent to which CSR has been able to contribute to 
community development in the Niger Delta, as highlighted above, have led to the view that the 
idea of CSR has outlived its usefulness, and that it is time to explore other more useful concepts 
like corporate accountability. Freeman and Liedtka (1991), in particular, argued that the idea 
of social responsibility has failed to help create the expected good society, and it has become a 
hindrance to meaningful conversations about corporations and good life. Hence, it should be 
abandoned. Corporate accountability, in a managerial sense, refers to issues of disclosure, 
auditing and monitoring of business practices, which are also consistent with the traditional 
preoccupation about “how to keep power under control…how to prevent its abuse, how to 
subject it to certain procedures and rules of conduct” (Schedler, 1999, p. 13). It can be seen as 
“an emancipatory concept that can be used to explore the social relationship that exists between 
6 
 
MNCs and their stakeholders with emphasis on external effects that relate to developing closer 
relationship and increasing transparency” (Odoeme, 2013, p. 747). Indeed, Utting and Marques 
(2010) note that ‘corporate accountability implies moving beyond ad hoc voluntary initiatives, 
top-down ‘doing gooding’ and very selective forms of stakeholder engagement. Instead it 
emphasises the need for mechanisms that oblige corporations to answer to various stakeholders, 
allow victims of corporate bad practices to channel grievances and seek redress, and entail 
consequences for companies that do not comply with agreed standards’. Central to this 
understanding of accountability are the concepts of ‘answerability’ and enforceability. While 
answerability refers to the obligation to provide account for one’s action or inaction, 
enforceability refers to the mechanisms for realizing answerability and sanctioning its non-
fulfillment where necessary (Schedler, 1999). Consequently, Newell (2003) has argued that 
while answerability has increased as more firms seek to validate their actions to a wide array 
of stakeholders affected by their activities via corporate reporting and disclosure, mechanisms 
of enforceability remain either weak or underdeveloped.  
Importantly, accountability apparently “conveys an image of transparency and 
trustworthiness” (Bovens, 2007, p. 448) as transparency suggests the rendering of things 
visible. Gray (1992, p. 415), for example, argues that:   
 
The development of accountability . . . increases the transparency of organisations. That 
is it increases the number of things that are made visible, increases the number of ways 
in which things are made visible, and, in doing so, encourages a greater openness.  
Although corporations apparently project a transparent posture, critics allude to the 
opaqueness of corporate transparency (Garsten and de Montoya, 2008; Roberts, 2009). This is 
because accountability and transparency are inseparably interwoven (Bovens, 2007). Gray et 
al. (2014) construe accountability as responsibilities to undertake actions and provide account 
of such actions to those with the rights to know, and a process of holding actors responsible for 
their actions. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 351) argue that  accountability provides the 
“mechanisms through which all those affected by an organisation’s actions can demand an  
account from the managers of that organisation regarding how and why the organisation has 
acted in the manner it has.” A corporation’s disclosure of their operational impacts on 
stakeholders is an essential element of accountability as Zadek (1998) argues for the increasing 
importance of corporations to not only alter their actions that affect stakeholders but also to 
report on the related social, ethical and environmental performance to enable stakeholders 
assess the extent to which the corporations have “listened” and responded to their expectations 
in practical terms.  
However, accountability and transparency are two important concepts contemporary 
corporations appear to appropriate to lend credibility to their enthusiasm about CSR (Christian 
Aid, 2004) under different guises ranging from self-imposed responsible business principles to 
adopted external codes such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Hence, Gray (2001) 
argues that accountability is a simple but often misused concept, whilst Bovens (2007) suggests 
it is generally appealing because it conveys a sense of transparency. Shearer (2002, p. 563) 
argues that accountability is an “intersubjective relationship whereby one is obligated to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of one’s actions to those to whom one is accountable.” 
Accordingly, these intersubjective relationships give these ‘others’ in accountability relations 
with the companies the right to define the terms for judging the accountability outcome (Gray 
et al., 1997; Shearer, 2002). This is consistent with Sinclair’s (1995, p. 221) idea that 
accountability “presupposes agreement about what constitutes an acceptable performance … 
(including) the language of justification.” Engagement is thus fundamental to the determination 
of acceptable performance or accountability outcome. It is therefore not surprising that 
accountability is equally construed as democratically embedded (Archel et al., 2011; Brown 
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and Dillard, 2013a, 2013b; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gray et al., 2014). This suggests that the 
democratic nature of accountability is reflected in discourses relating to giving voices to the 
accountees. For example, Bovens argues that accountability transcends monologue, 
propaganda or a mere giving of information because it must entrench a mechanism for debate 
and engagement.   However, Adams (2004) and Unerman and Bennett (2004) argue that 
engagement is not identical to accountability but facilitates a mechanism that promotes it. But 
as dialogue or engagement is embedded in power relations, meaningful engagement is doubtful 
when the engaging parties have power asymmetry (Archel et al., 2011; Dillard, 2011; Gray, 
2000, 2001; Gray, et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2001; Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
Nevertheless, greater corporate-community engagement is advocated in the extractive 
industry to promote cordial corporate-community relationship (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012), 
because mutual understanding and trust are vital for peaceful and harmonious corporate-
community relationships (Idemudia, 2014a). A truly managed CSR practice that promotes the 
voices and expectations of the communities will apparently sustain corporate SLO (Slack, 
2012).  Despite the apparent corporate-community power asymmetry, the Niger Delta 
communities and oil MNCs in Nigeria consider corporate-community engagement as a 
(potential) strategy for promoting responsible corporate behaviour and accountability (Egbon, 
2014) given that accountability is equally construed as “informed relations of trust” (Dar, 2014, 
p. 133). An engagement that does not privilege the dominant voice will likely promote CSR 
practices that incorporate the expectations of beneficiaries negatively impacted by corporate 
operations. Such engagement is embedded in dialogic logic or action (see Bebbington et al., 
2007; Contrafatto et al., 2015).  
Engagement drawing on dialogic logic is not oblivious of differences in the worldviews 
of the various stakeholders but focuses on building informed consensus that obliterate the 
dominance of each stakeholder’s primordial position. As Bebbington et al. (2007, p. 364) 
argue, “both parties commit to a process whereby both expect to learn something of the 
worldview of the other, both address structural issues that constrain them and collectively they 
strive to create some better outcome.” This suggests that dialogic engagement seeks out and 
problematises the conflict situation with a view to cooperatively articulate feasible solutions 
that will not impose the primordial ideology of the dominant group (see Contrafatto et al., 
2015). Consequently, Bebbington et al. (2007) argue that successful dialogue occurs within 
open (transparent) processes in which each dialoguing individual is accorded the rights to 
speak, be heard, and be able to exercise agency. According to Bebbington et al. (2007, p. 372),  
 
A focus on stakeholders and their participation in organizational processes may also 
reflect a more dialogic framing of accountability. This would have two elements to it: 
dialogic entitlements (for example, information and participation rights) and dialogic 
institutions (where views can be debated in robust fashion).  
In this sense, accountability is about how relationships among multiple actors are 
negotiated, reproduced and reinforced to create a continually evolving “system of reciprocal 
rights and obligations” (Dixon et al. 2006, p. 407). While some scholars have focused on  either 
‘upward’ flow of accountability to ‘external’ social agent via formal reporting, or ‘downward’ 
flow of accountability to lower level institutions or groups, others have focused on lateral 
accountabilities to stakeholders that are situated inside organizational settings (Kemp et al., 
2012). This is because in tracking the directionality of accountability, the concept can be seen 
as an expression of the complex interactions and mutual dependencies between an organization 
and its multiple stakeholders (Lozano, 2004). Hence, Kemp et al. (2012) argued that this 
approach to accountability can open up discursive spaces that go beyond just verification and 
auditing, but towards engaging accountability’s dialogic potential for shared reflection and 
learning. As such, Garvey and Newell (2005) have noted that one of the important elements of 
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accountability within corporate-community relations is the corporation’s adopted approach for 
beneficiaries’ participation. Essentially, accountability and transparency encourage 
engagement, trust, giving of voices and information sharing, which are fundamental to cordial 
corporate-community relations. As such, Idemudia (2009, p. 140) argues that “allowing for 
accountability and sustainability mechanisms in CSR projects is important in an environment 
like the Niger Delta where conflict is endemic.”  Unfortunately, ‘processes of accountability 
continue to be obscured within scholarly debates about CSR in the extractive industries’ (Kemp 
et al., 2012).  In that regard, Kemp et al. (2012) suggested the need to shift from current 
conventional auditing culture referred to as ‘new accounting’ towards strengthening 
operational-level knowledge about accountability as a basis for a better understanding of 
corporate social performance. This paper seeks to directly respond to this call within the context 
of the Niger Delta. 
 
4.1 Corporate-community agreements and the extractive industry  
It is evident that resource extraction can produce both negative and positive impacts on 
local communities (Basu et al., 2015; Kemp et al., 2011; Moffat and Zhang, 2014). However, 
the positive benefits of resource extraction for communities can easily be eroded by their 
negative social and environmental impacts, which have historically been the case in most 
developing countries (Basu et al., 2015). Corporate negative environmental impacts promote 
criticism from stakeholders and possibly corporate legitimacy crisis (see Botes and Samkin, 
2013; Matilal and Höpfl, 2009). As such, O’Faircheallaigh (2013) contends that corporate-
community agreements provide opportunities for local communities to shape the conditions of 
resource extraction on their land and therefore redistribute the balance of power that has 
traditionally served to undermine their rights and marginalize their developmental priorities. 
Indeed, company-community agreement is now widely considered to be a practical mechanism 
for recognizing the rights, needs and priorities of local communities as key ‘stakeholders’ that 
are impacted by resource extraction, for managing the impacts of resource extraction and 
ensuring that the benefits derived are widely shared (Keenan et al., 2016). In that regard, 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) between local communities, corporations and 
government agencies are seen as useful mechanism through which the extractive industries 
(i.e., mining, oil and gas, and forestry) can contribute to community development, meet 
regulatory requirements, define stakeholder expectations and mutual obligations and manage 
non-technical risks (Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Fidler and Hitch, 2007; Baynes et al., 2016). 
However, the challenge of negotiating and implementing agreement that potentially contributes 
to community development while also ensuring that risks and impacts associated with resource 
extraction are successfully managed remains problematic (Keenan et al., 2016).   
Nevertheless, corporate-community agreements often take many names, structures and 
processes (Brereton et al., 2011). For example, varying degrees of MoUs are articulated in the 
literature using various terminologies such as community development agreement [CDA] 
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; 2015), community benefits agreement [CBA] (Fidler and Hitch, 
2007; O’Fairchealliagh, 2013), memorandum of understanding [MoU] (Leke et al., 2014; 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2015) and global memorandum of understanding [GMoU] (Idemudia and 
Osayande, 2016), negotiated environmental agreement [NEA] (Noble and Nick, 2011). A 
review of the literature suggests that CDAs, CBAs, NEAs are partly backed by legal or quasi-
legal frameworks and so are usually not only a voluntary corporate initiative (see 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2015). However, the distinction between the various forms of MoUs appears 
to be slippery, as only few works have paid particular attention to the differences. For instance, 
O’Faircheallaigh (2015) argues that CDAs range from legally binding contracts to voluntary 
MoUs. But many other studies on CDAs apparently take such distinction for granted except 
O’Faircheallaigh’s (2015) study that clearly stated it focused on legally binding CDAs. At any 
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rate, MoUs could also be contemplated among tiers of governments, which McCrimmon and 
Fanning (2010) conceptualized as formalised non-binding agreements between parties, which 
can also be ignored by the consenting parties. MoUs are not legally binding but based on mutual 
obligation. McCrimmon and Fanning (2010) articulated some critical success factors of MoU 
such as unambiguous mutual desire to cooperate, negotiated priorities, outcomes upon which 
to situate accountability, inclusivity, and transfer of financial resources if part of the MoU. 
Thus, a good MoU stipulates the activities to be carried out and how expectations should be 
monitored. Integral to MoU signing is the recognition that the parties are partners and would 
assume leadership role vis-a-vis the MoU subject-matter (Leke et al., 2014).  However, it is 
important to recognize that MoUs are products of negotiation and bargaining between the 
consenting parties and can be prejudiced by unequal power relations (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; 
2015). As such, the core challenge confronting corporate-community MoUs is that they are 
often informed by the unequal power relationship that exists between corporations and 
communities, and thus the limited nature of enforceability mechanisms in such agreements 
(O’Fairchealliagh, 2013).   
Nevertheless, the enforceability of MoU is often predicated on the assumption that 
corporations now need both legal licence and SLO (Lacey et al., 2012). Indeed, SLO “involves 
having the acceptance and approval (and perhaps support and consent) of local communities to 
operate” (Lacey et al., 2012, p. vi). Whereas MoUs or CDAs are formalised written 
agreements, an SLO is an informal, intangible and unwritten implicit licence  (Owen and 
Kemp, 2013) that is slippery to monitor/measure (Lacey et al., 2012) as what constitutes it is 
less developed (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Although SLO is an implicit licence, its absence 
supposedly produces untoward consequences for corporations especially in the form of a 
legitimacy crisis that can undermine business operations. SLO is apparently more complex to 
articulate than MoU in a corporate-community context as the community stakeholders give 
legitimacy to the latter whereas stakeholders extending beyond the local community give 
legitimacy to the former (see Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Lacey et al., 2012; Prno and 
Slocombe, 2012).  
An MoU portrays corporate commitment to community development in part, at least, 
to sustain corporate legitimacy. Consequently, MoU could be construed as a means to gain 
and/or sustain SLO because working with the communities to meet their expectations and avoid 
conflicts is central to the process of maintaining SLO (Lacey et al., 2012; Moffat and Zhang, 
2014). MNCs are increasingly under pressure from stakeholders to demonstrate their SLO 
credential (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013), which makes SLO an integral part of stakeholders’ 
discourses in the extractive industry (O’Faircheallaigh, 2015). As such, it has been argued that 
corporations mostly use CSR initiatives to gain SLO (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Ruwhiu and 
Carter, 2016). Although GMoU, not SLO, is the emphasis of this study, an SLO is apparently 
strengthened by the adoption of [G]MoU in the Niger Delta context. However, as previously 
mentioned, an obvious weakness of corporate voluntary initiatives like the GMoU, is the lack 
of mechanism to enforce performance (O’Faircheallaigh, 2015).  This is particularly the case 
given that oil MNCs can use their discursive power to appropriate the meaning of SLO and 
accountability so as to claim reputational benefits while masking the gaps between company 
and stakeholder expectations (Owen and Kemp, 2013). In contrast, in their study of a poor 
township in South Africa, McIntyre et al. (2015) found that poor communities believed that 
they have influence over the extension of SLO. Consequently, it is important to examine the 
process rather than just the outcome of corporate voluntary initiatives such as the GMoU.  
The need to assess CSR process via accountability and transparency lens is due partly 
to corporate-community power asymmetry and the need to better understand its implication for 
company and stakeholder expectations. Power asymmetry in corporate-community relations 
and engagement favours corporations (Kemp et al., 2011; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). Imbalance 
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in power sharing between actors undermines equal sharing of decision-making, authority and 
responsibility, thus engendering conflicts (Baynes et al., 2016). Good governance is one that 
devolves power to the community stakeholders to mitigate unequal power relations, to promote 
equitable control and decision-making. According to Baynes et al. (2016, p. 169), “governance 
itself is more about the power to make, implement and enforce decisions, rather than just the 
formal arrangements about how decisions are supposed to be made”. Power, dialogue and 
participation are important in promoting mutual beneficial corporate-community relations and 
ensuring that CSR projects meet stakeholder expectations (Kemp et al., 2011).  With mining 
companies usually perceived as undermining the voices of community stakeholders (Basu et 
al., 2015), granting communities voices in corporate matters affecting them engenders 
cooperation (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Importantly, accountability-linked strategies such as 
continual communication, transparent information disclosure to communities and strong CDAs 
[or MoUs] have been inextricably linked to the strengthening of corporate legitimacy (see 
Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Owen and Kemp, 2012).   
 
4.2 Shell and community development: the emergence of GMoU strategy 
The nascent stage of CSR development in Nigeria has meant that CSR policies and 
practices are continually evolving, and as in most other countries, the CSR agenda that 
companies in Nigeria pursue depends heavily on how the corporation conceptualizes and 
understands CSR (Idemudia, 2007a). Various corporations constantly seek to tailor their 
corporate strategy for meeting their CSR obligations to the demands of their business 
environment by seeking to improve upon shortcomings in previous strategies. A good example 
is Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria’s (SPDC) CSR initiatives that have 
gradually evolved from mere Community Assistance (CA) in the 1960s, to Community 
Development (CD) in the 1990s, and Sustainable Community Development (SCD) in 2004 
(see SPDC, 2003; 2004). According to SPDC (2004), this strategic transition from CA to SCD 
was in part an attempt by the corporation to respond to increasing community pressures for it 
to do more as well as improve the impact of its CD programmes on host communities. As such, 
Ite (2007) attributes the changes in SPDC’s CSR strategies to a combination of internal 
consideration and external pressures.  
However, others such as Akpan (2006), Eweje (2007) and Idemudia (2010a, 2009b) 
attribute the changes to the fact that both the CA and CD strategies often lacked community 
input in the design and implementation of CSR, which meant that either CSR resources were 
misallocated or hijacked by a few community elites. Similarly, the poor implementation of 
CSR projects and their lack of sustainability was also another factor that drove the changes in 
Shell’s CSR strategy (Draper, 2010; Ite, 2007). Indeed, Ite (2007) suggested that a major 
problem with Shell’s CSR strategies, which also explains why they failed to produce the 
desired result, relates to the company’s tendency to take a partial rather than holistic approach 
to community development. To address these problems, Shell recently turned to corporate-
NGO-community partnership called Global Memorandum of Understanding to contribute to 
community development in its host communities and secure its SLO (Idemudia and Osanyande, 
2016).  
Unlike MoUs that are often an agreement between a particular community and a 
company, a GMoU is an agreement between Shell and a cluster of several communities 
identified based on local government area, ethnicity and historical affinities. Under the terms 
of the agreement, Shell provides funding for five years and the communities decide, plan and 
implement community development projects.  In addition, Shell facilitates the capacity 
building of the GMoUs by providing access to development experts usually their NGO partners 
to oversee project implementation. The Community Development Board (CDB) is the core 
governance institution of the GMoU, and it is supposedly embedded in the participating 
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communities via the community trust. The Community Trust (CT) consists of ten persons with 
at least three women who are usually resident in and trusted within the participating 
communities. From these ten CT members, each community provides three persons with at 
least one woman to establish the CDB. Hence, the community trusts are responsible for 
ensuring that the GMoUs’ benefits reach their individual communities via effective 
representation of their respective communities at the CDB. The CDB is responsible for 
managing and coordinating the development activities of the GMoU across all the communities 
in a given cluster. 
The CDB consists of all the chairpersons, secretaries and members of the CT, a 
representative of SPDC, local government, state government, The Niger Delta Development 
Commission, National Petroleum Investment Management Services and donor community. 
However, Alfred (2013) has noted that with the exception of SPDC’s representatives, the other 
representatives appear to be uninterested. Nonetheless, each CDB has standing committees for 
finance and resources management, partnering, communication and capacity building, peace 
and conflict resolution, and technical matters. Furthermore, the CDBs are entitled to a small 
percentage of the annual negotiated sum from the GMoU agreement to manage their 
administrative functions. Finally, the GMoU is underpinned by an Operations Policy and 
Procedure Guidelines (OPPG) as the CDB becomes the only legitimate interlocutor recognized 
by SPDC in its engagement with its host communities. As at 2011, SPDC has signed and 
implemented agreements with twenty-seven clusters that cover two hundred and ninety 
communities (representing about thirty percent of its host communities) and nine of the twenty-
seven CDBs have grown to become registered foundations that receive third party funding 
(Shell Companies in Nigeria, 2013).  
The GMoU initiative cuts across a wide range of areas such as economic empowerment, 
capacity building and improving the quality of life of host communities. In contrast to the 
various variants of MoUs in the mining sectors of Canada, Australia, Papua New Guinea 
articulated largely around socio-economic benefits and environmental impact mitigation, 
Shell’s GMoU does not contemplate addressing environmental concerns. However, in contrast 
to Shell’s CA or CD strategies that were largely top-down, the GMoU appears to be a bottom-
up process that gives voice to communities and put them in the driving seat of their own 
development. In addition, the model claims to be an instrument for effective community 
engagement based on transparency and accountability.  However, Aaron (2012) has argued that 
while the turn to GMoU by Shell in Nigeria is a radical departure from its previous CSR 
strategies, the GMOU is still being plagued by old challenges and as such has failed to deliver 
sustainable development benefits for the Niger Delta people. In contrast, Alfred (2013) 
commended the success of the GMoU so far.  Indeed, based on a participatory stakeholder 
evaluation, Hoben et al. (2012) suggested that despite some weaknesses, the GMoU is 
contributing to community development in the region. For Idemudia and Osayande (2016), this 
disagreement is partly due to the difficulty of measuring the impact of CSR in the Niger Delta, 
yet it supports our view that debate over the relationship between CSR and development in the 
region tends to focus more on the developmental outcomes of CSR rather than the process 
through which CSR seeks to contribute to development. Consequently, our findings here will 
contribute to the extant literature on CSR and community development in two ways. First, it 
would deepen our understanding of CSR and community development relationship by 
addressing an aspect of the relationship that has so far been under-explored within the context 
of the Niger Delta. Second, the findings presented here will complement extant works by 
identifying potential areas of corporate–community agreement that need to be strengthened if 
CSR initiatives are to deliver on their promise. 
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5. Research design 
The data for this study is generated from Shell’s GMoU reports of 2010-2013, which 
included the first and most recent (as far as we are aware). The GMoU reports were obtained 
via the internet. Nonetheless, these reports are comparatively similar in content, except that 
while the 2010 documents referred to the GMoU as a signed agreement, the others called it a 
written statement. This change is immaterial and so does not merit any attention here. 
Corporations use various channels such as newsletter, annual reports, verbal, advertising and 
public relations brochure to communicate with their stakeholders (Buhr, 1998) with such 
reports apparently capturing management representation of reality (Bebbington, 1999).  The 
GMoU document is a specialised stand-alone report published by Shell Companies in Nigeria 
and it is an important document as it focuses solely on Shell’s GMoU performance and process.  
An interpretive or qualitative content analysis is used to analyse the GMoU texts 
according to themes that are drawn from the background theoretical review in this study. Belal 
and Momin (2009), Gray et al. (1995), and Tregidga et al. (2012), for example, have 
highlighted the broad use of content analysis (primarily quantitative or form-oriented content 
analysis) in prior studies in social and environmental accountability research (SEAR), but 
Milne and Adler (1999) criticised the use of content analysis in SEAR in terms of the reliability 
of the coding instruments adopted in classifying corporate disclosures. However, Milne and 
Adler (1999) apparently focus on quantitative rather than qualitative content analysis. As 
content analysis can be employed as both quantitative and qualitative analytical methods, Smith 
and Taffler (2000), Merkl-Davis et al. (2011) and Vourvachis and Woodward (2015) 
distinguish between form-oriented (quantitative) and meaning-oriented 
(qualitative/interpretive/thematic) content analysis. Whilst the form variant focuses on 
counting of words or other concrete references, the meaning variant analyses themes embedded 
in the texts being investigated. The form-oriented content analysis has been dominant in social 
and environmental accountability research.  
Some scholars consider critical discourse analysis as a type of meaning-oriented content 
analysis (see Merkl-Davis et al., 2011; Vourvachis and Woodward, 2015). Meaning-oriented 
content analysis is also considered by some scholars as thematic analysis (see Marks and 
Yardley, 2004). Whilst Marks and Yardley (2004) suggest that thematic analysis [or meaning-
oriented content analysis] could be deductive or inductive, Vourvachis and Woodward (2015) 
suggest that it could be deductive, abductive or inductive. Inductive content analysis suggests 
that the coding of themes is data-driven and abductive content analysis suggests an iterative 
generation of coding themes by moving forward and backward between data and theoretical 
concepts. The deductive approach draws from existing theoretical ideas for the purpose of 
coding. According to Marks and Yardley (2004), such deductively derived themes allow for 
replicability, extension, or refutation, of prior discoveries. This study adopts this form of 
meaning-oriented content analysis, which Vourvachis and Woodward (2015) also refer to as 
semantic analysis and for which the coded categories must reflect the purpose of the research 
to give validity to the coding.   
This study is guided by a coding guide involving issues of accountability and 
transparency, community participation, control and ownership of GMOU processes. Hence, 
we adopt Gill’s (2000) notion of ‘sceptical reading’, which implies searching for purpose 
lurking behind the ways something is said or represented. Indeed, Gill (1996) suggests treating 
the way something is said as being ‘a solution to a problem’, which informed how we organised 
our analysis. To overcome potential bias, the authors compared notes afterwards and resolved 
any disagreements. Evidently, the narratives in the GMoU documents appear to communicate 
the responsiveness of Shell to stakeholders’ criticisms regarding its deficient process of 
sustainable community development initiatives.[2]. Shell’s GMoU disclosures appear to focus 
attention on key issues on which it, and generally companies in the extractive industries, is/are 
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criticised by stakeholders in resonance with Merkl-Davis et al.’s (2013) assertion that CSR 
communication is acute during periods of controversy or conflict.    
 
6. GMoU through corporate accountability lens: analysis and discussion 
For the purpose of this study, we particularly focus on three aspects of the GMoU 
processes that traditionally have been the basis of criticisms of Shell’s CSR initiatives in the 
Niger Delta, and which the new GMoU strategy supposedly addresses. These issues are 
community participation in their own development; accountability and transparency between 
Shell and its host communities, and the control and ownership of GMoU processes to ensure 
project sustainability (see Akpan, 2006; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2009b; 2007b; Ite, 2007). 
 
6.1 GMoU as a participatory dialogic approach to community development 
As the background literature suggests, one of the areas Shell and other oil companies 
in Nigeria have been criticised vis-à-vis their CSR initiatives involves their unilateral 
determination of community development projects, which are apparently different to 
communities’ priorities. Consequently, engagement and communication are essential to 
understanding the needs and priorities of the communities. Shell considers the GMoU as a 
veritable means of communicating and engaging with the communities by stating that:  
They [GMoUs] encourage greater participation and create a more open and transparent 
way for SPDC to communicate with communities and help support social investment 
projects (Shell Companies in Nigeria [SCIN hereafter], 2010, p. 1)  
Indeed, the GMoU is a departure from the unorganised MoUs with individual 
communities which appear to create divisions and mutual suspicions among communities. 
These organised GMoUs appear to reflect local concerns when the choice of community 
projects are decided and managed by the communities themselves.  This might account for why 
Shell considers it a more robust approach claiming that: 
This system [GMoU] replaces the previous approach whereby SPDC agreed to 
hundreds of separate development projects with individual communities and managed 
them directly and separately (SCIN, 2013, p. 1).   
As such, in order to demonstrate the participatory nature of the GMoUs, Shell states 
that: 
Under the terms of the GMoU, the communities decide the development they want 
while SPDC on behalf of its joint venture partners provide secure funding for five years 
ensuring that communities have stable and reliable finances as they undertake the 
implementation of their community development plan (SCIN, 2011, p. 1)  
While there is no doubt that the new GMoU strategy has opened some space for 
community participation that was lacking in Shell’s previous CSR strategy, there is a need to 
interpret such participation with caution given that corporate-community power asymmetry is 
often likely to sway corporate-community participatory dialogue toward corporate advantage 
(Kemp et al., 2011; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). Besides, meaningful engagement takes place in a 
dialogic context where the view of a subset or dominant group is not subtly imposed on the 
other engaging stakeholders.  This unfortunately seems not to be the case as Idemudia and 
Osanyande (2016, p. 9) argue that “while the GMoU is supposedly a bottom-up participatory 
approach to community development, there continue[s] to remain key structural constraints of 
the ability of communities to actively participate in their own development and in the 
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governance of corporate-community relations”. This is because the boundaries of community 
participation is set within a particular understanding of the process of development in which 
oil extraction is central and alternative meanings and pathways to development are foreclosed. 
In other words, community participation is restricted to how oil funds provided by Shell for 
community development are to be spent as opposed to the more substantive question of whether 
oil extraction should continue to be a basis for community development in the face of the 
negative externalities it has generated. For instance, Faleti (2004) noted that there is often 
significant anger within communities over environmental degradation associated with 
dredging, contamination, spills and salt water inflow that negatively impact local livelihoods; 
but these issues are not incorporated into the scope of the activities covered by the GMoU. The 
implication therefore is that GMoU promotes a particular form of community participation that 
is consistent with oil MNCs’ interest of continuing oil extraction in the region. Hence, it can 
be argued that while the GMoU does allow for community consultation, it does not yet foster 
substantive community participation in corporate-led community development initiatives. 
 
6.2 Transparency and accountability between communities and oil MNC   
A core driver of corporate-community conflicts in the Niger delta is the lack of trust 
(Eweje, 2007; Idemudia, 2007b) and the mismanagement/misappropriation of CSR funds 
meant for community development  by a few. Consequently, an emphasis on transparency in 
the GMoU is particularly important in any efforts to rebuild trust between communities and 
Shell as well as ensure sustainable community development. Indeed, the extant literature has 
strongly linked effective engagement or participation to transparency and accountability. Thus, 
Shell highlights that: 
The GMoU represents an important shift in approach, placing emphasis on more 
transparent and accountable process, regular communication with grassroots, 
sustainability and conflict prevention (SCIN, 2010, 2011, p. 1) 
It also ensures high levels of transparency, inclusiveness and accountability in 
managing development funds (SCIN, 2013, p. 1) 
Shell Sustainability Report (2011, p. 1) also asserts that: “we [Shell] believe 
transparency in our operations helps build trust”. However, we found that the emphasis on 
transparency and accountability in the GMoU reports was on the activities of, and amongst, the 
clusters of communities in GMoU, as opposed to the accountability and transparency between 
Shell and the clusters of communities. In other words, there was an absence of reference to 
corporate-community transparency and accountability. Hence, while the GMoU for good 
reasons emphasises issues of transparency and accountability in the activities of the clusters 
within the GMoU, questions of corporate-community accountability seemed to have been 
selectively ignored.  This position is supported by the fact that in a recent effort to assess the 
impact of its GMoU, Shell narrowly and vaguely defined the criteria of transparency and 
accountability as follows: 
 This refers to openness to public scrutiny, available, accessible and disclosed 
information on processes, activities and transactions, and periodic stewardship 
feedback. It implies the extent to which GMoU processes especially the institution is 
open to scrutiny and provides information on its activities to its stakeholders (Idemudia 
and Osanyande, 2016).  
The consequence is that while Shell systematically downplays the importance of its 
accountability obligations to communities and ignores the role of the lack of corporate 
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accountability in corporate-community conflict, it invariably suggests that the lack of 
transparency and accountability within local communities is responsible for problems 
associated with community development and corporate-community conflict.  This is largely 
consistent with Gray’s (2001) assertion that accountability can be misplaced or misused. In 
other words, corporations might rhetorically appropriate accountability to maintain the 
dominant social ideology (see Garsten and de Montoya, 2008; Moneva et al., 2006; Stoney and 
Winstanley, 2001).  
Despite the significant environmental impacts of the oil and gas MNCs in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria (UNEP, 2011), we found that Shell’s GMoU reports are conspicuously silent 
on the environmental impacts of the corporation. This silence is an obvious lack of transparency 
and accountability in relation to environmental sustainability. However,  it is not surprising 
that the GMoU fails to directly address the issue of environmental degradation, which resonates 
with Hassan and Kouhy’s (2015) recent argument that oil MNCs operating in the Niger Delta 
show weak commitments to environmental accountability. The implication here is that 
accountability and transparency seem to be interpreted in a very selective and restrictive 
manner by Shell such that it applies only to the relationship between the communities in a 
cluster, but not to the relationship between communities and Shell. This perhaps explains why 
despite increase in community development spending, corporate-community conflict continues 
to remain endemic. This is because as Idemudia (2009b) argues, no amount of roads, schools 
or hospitals constructed can compensate for or alleviate environmental degradation or its 
effects on local communities. 
 
6.3 Governance, control and ownership of CSR initiatives  
  A major factor that undermined the ability of Shell’s previous CSR strategy to 
contribute to community development was lack of sense of ownership of CSR process and 
initiatives by host communities, which often resulted in the poor sustainability of CSR projects 
(Idemudia, 2009; Ite, 2004; 2007). Indeed, Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) have suggested that 
this problem has resulted in the proliferation of a kind of ‘dependency mentality’ among host 
communities that has led to more demands being made on oil MNCs. However, Idemudia 
(2014b) disputes this suggestion that a ‘dependency mentality’ pervades local communities as 
empirical data showed that not only were communities aware of their reciprocal responsibility 
but also were willing to undertake such responsibility. Nonetheless, Idemudia (2009b) noted 
that because of lack of sense of ownership due to the absence of community control over CSR 
initiatives, communities often lacked both the capacity and interest to maintain such CSR 
projects as they were seen as Shell’s projects. Consequently, the turn to GMoU strategy 
potentially and partly addressed this problem. Indeed, SPDC notes that: 
It [GMoU] brings those communities together with representatives of local and state 
governments, SPDC and non-profit organisations (development NGOs) in a decision-
making committee. These committees – which are not controlled by SPDC – give 
communities greater control and ownership over their own development. … (SCIN, 
2010, p. 1)   
As such, Shell asserts that: 
… GMoUs have engendered better ownership and a stronger sense of pride amongst 
communities as they are responsible for implementing their projects. (SCIN, 2013, p. 
1)  
Similarly, the nature of inclusivity in the GMoU’s governance structure might suggest 
that communities are likely to be insulated from undue corporate influence. For example, the 
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inclusion of NGOs as capacity builders and the expectation that other actors like NGOs and 
government representatives will be active within the GMoU should in principle allow 
communities take control and ownership over the decision-making process concerning their 
own development. In addition, the GMoU’s governance structure appears to weaken accusation 
against Shell that its CSR creates an opportunistic tendency for community elites to capture 
CSR benefits at the expense of their communities (see Idemudia, 2010a). With this approach, 
the community representatives know the amount of money that accrues to their communities 
and they also exercise control over how such monies are expended. For example, Shell asserts 
that:  
SPDC provides the committee … with secure funding for five years, ensuring that the 
communities have stable and reliable finances as they undertake their work. … 
Communities identify their own needs, decide how to spend the money, and implement 
projects by themselves (SCIN, 2010, p. 1)  
The significance of the above assertion stems from the fact that in Shell’s old CSR 
strategy, CSR projects were often either poorly implemented or not utilised as they were 
inconsistent with communities’ priorities (Akpan, 2006; Idemudia, 2009b). Hence, it suggests 
that the incidence of abandonment of CSR projects in communities will be unlikely. 
Importantly, this again is supported by the fact that communities are given voice to select their 
projects to match their allocated GMoU funds over a period of time. However, in practice, the 
extent to which communities exercise control over the GMoU remains debatable. First, as 
previously noted, while other actors like NGOs and government actors are expected to be full 
participants in the activities of the GMoU, in reality they are often not active. Similarly, 
communities have no say over which NGOs Shell nominates to facilitate their capacity 
building. For example, Shell’s and Daper’s claims below on the participation of independent 
development experts in the GMoU process are apparently contradictory: 
   
SPDC also provides access to development experts to oversee project implementation 
and build the capacity of the CDBs to grow into functional community development 
foundations (SCIN, 2013, p. 1) 
Weak local NGO capacity has led to NGO staff invariably following instructions from 
SPDC implementation staff. The NGOs are often unable to achieve an equal dialogue 
with SPDC … Any perceived opposition to SPDC’s interests is dismissed, and NGOs 
fear ‘losing their contract’ if they fail to follow SPDC instructions (Draper, 2010, p. 72)  
This implies that the countervailing force to Shell’s undue influence over the GMoU is 
absent in reality. Furthermore, the approval of funding to clusters/communities comes with a 
stringent but unpublicized conditionality. This undisclosed clause integral to the GMoU is 
called Freedom-To-Operate (FTO). We understood this through the interactions with some 
community members and two NGOs that assist Shell in the implementation of its GMoU 
initiative. This suggests that GMoU is embedded in power relations and ultimately serve as an 
instrument to further stifle communities’ power to undermine corporate interest. The 
implication is that communities’ actual control over GMoU is at best limited and not based on 
corporate-community accountability.   
 
6   Conclusion and emerging issues 
There are three main emerging issues. First, it seems that in principle, the GMoU 
embodies some of the critical success factors for an MOU as suggested by McCrimmon and 
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Fanning (2010), but lacks other core success factors in practice. For example, inclusivity, and 
transfer of funds, that are key success factors seem to be recognised in the GMoU model. 
However, the GMoU seems to fall short in the areas of outcomes upon which to situate 
accountability, negotiated priorities and efforts to prevent the undue influence of Shell over the 
GMoU due to corporate-community unequal power relationship. Hence, while the GMoU is 
certainly an improvement over previous CSR strategies, it is still unlikely a panacea for issues 
related to sustainable community development in the Niger Delta.   
Second, The GMoU is at present informed by a restrictive interpretation of 
participation, a selective application of transparency and accountability, and remains squarely 
under the control of Shell. Hence, contrary to O’Faircheallaigh’s (2013) suggestion that 
corporate-community agreement allows for the redistribution of power between corporations 
and communities, the GMoU seems to consolidate power in the hands of Shell via a strategy 
of accommodation by legitimation (see Hamman and Acutt, 2003) that minimises corporate 
criticism as well as limits further demands that can be made on Shell. In other words, the 
changes that Shell has made to its CSR strategy allows the company to project an image of 
being responsive to the demands of external stakeholders without given up control over its 
corporate-driven community development efforts. Indeed, while changes to its CSR strategies 
might be seen as an indirect form of answerability and the GMoU reports as a direct form, 
GMoU lacks any measure of enforceability which is a necessity if corporate-community 
accountability is to be meaningful. As such, the GMoU as a form of corporate-community 
agreement seems to confirm Garvey and Newell’s (2005) assertion that the mechanisms of 
enforceability remain either underdeveloped or, in this case, are selectively and deliberately 
ignored.    
Third, for GMoU to fully realise its potential and ensure that increase in CSR spending 
leads to win-win outcomes for both communities and Shell, then Shell must deliberately 
promote upward, downward and lateral accountabilities of its GMoUs. This would require 
Shell to relinquish more control over the GMoU and accept that the absence of total corporate 
control comes with some risks as well as sustainable benefits. In other words, Shell needs to 
adopt what Schmitt (2010) has described as ‘open strategizing’, suggesting an open approach 
to building stakeholder relation in which stakeholders are allowed to collaboratively navigate 
through a number of diverse and challenging socio-political and ecological issues without 
following a rigidly structured management plan. Indeed, Schmitt (2010) suggests that Shell 
successfully used this strategy to manage and implement the Camisea gas project in Peru within 
a difficult business environment.  
 
Notes 
1. Subsidiary of Royal/Dutch Shell in Nigeria 
2. Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2016), for example, find that companies in Mauritius change 
disclosures regarding their CSR practices as a reaction to local tensions and government 
policy in a manner to manage public impression. The uniqueness of Shell’s GMoU 
unlike the CSR context Soobaroyen and Mahadeo allude to is that it is a self-imposed 
CSR initiative with the rhetoric of promoting community involvement. 
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